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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW- DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE PowER - UTAH
MILK CONTROL Ac;r - The Utah Milk Control Act declared the necessity
of stabilizing the production and distribution of market milk, for the purpose of
insuring "a continuous and adequate supply of pure, wholesome milk." 1 The
state board of agriculture was authorized to fix prices 2 and regulate the surplus
of milk in particular marketing areas. 8 Provision was made for public hearings
to precede the board's issuance of regulatory orders. 4 In fixing prices, the board
was directed to consider the cost of "producing, handling, pasteurizing, and
distributing" the milk to be sold.5 There was no requirement that the orders
promulgated contain any specific provisions. Pursuant to the provisions of this
act, an order was issued purporting to regulate the Salt Lake milk marketing
area. Plaintiffs, having refused to comply with the terms of the order and being
threatened with the revocation of their licenses as distributors, applied for a
writ of prohibition against the board. Held, that the statute was unconstitutional
as an improper delegation of legislative power. Ordered that a permanent writ
of prohibition be issued. Rowell v. State Board of Agriculture, (Utah, 1940)
99 P. (2d) I.
The principal case is particularly interesting by contrast with another recent
case, United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative,6 in which the Supreme Court
of the United States upheld a similar federal statute. To say that the decisions
merely represent divergent attitudes on the broad question of delegation of
powers is not adequately to explain the contrary results obtained. For, in general,
the Utah court has taken a liberal view of the separation of powers doctrine.1
A more satisfactory reconciliation of the cases may be based upon significant
differences appearing in the language of the statutes. The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, the validity of which was concerned in the Rock Royal case,
expresses a fairly definite legislative policy; 8 it sets forth specific factors which
the secretary of agriculture is to consider in deciding upon the promulgation of
orders; 9 it provides a comprehensive administrative procedure to be observed in
Utah Laws (1937), c. 7, § 2.
Ibid.,§ 4(b) (5).
8 Ibid.,§ 4{b) (2).
" Ibid., §§ 6, 7, 8. It was not required that the board make any express findings
of fact, such as were recommended in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388,
55 S. Ct. 241 (1934).
5 Utah Laws (1937), c. 7, § 4(b) (5).
6 307 U. S. 533, 59 S. Ct. 993 (1939). The decision affirmed the constitutionality of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. L. 246, amending
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 48 Stat. L. 31, 7 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 601
et seq. See note in 38 M1cH. L. REv. 540 (1940).
1 For a recent decision of the Utah court, concerning the question of delegation
of powers, see McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 85 P. (2d) 608
(1938), wherein the Utah Minimum Wage Law was sustained.
8 " • • • establish prices to farmers at a level that will give agricultural commodities
a purchasing power ••. equivalent to the purchasing power of agricultural commodities
in the base period.••• (2) To protect the interest of the consumer••••" Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. L. 247, 7 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 602.
9 Ibid., §§ 602, 6o8e.
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the issuance of orders; 10 and it imposes minimum requirements as to the prc1visions of the orders finally issued.11 The Utah Milk Control Act, in contrast,
contains a very general declaration of policy, barely sketches the elements to
which the board should give attention, and states no requisites as to the contents
of the orders which are published. It may realistically be argued that not much
broader discretionary powers are conferred by the Utah act than by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act; for the only binding restriction on the
administrative agency's action contained in the latter statute and not in the
former is the requirement that every order must include certain minimum provisions. And, as has been pointed out in a dissenting opinion of Justice Roberts,12
even this restriction is more apparent than real. But then it has never been considered a necessary condemnation of a statute that it grants extensive powers to
an administrative agency.18 The prime defect of the Utah act seems not to lie
so much in the delegation of sweeping power as in the absence of adequate aids
for the exercise of that power. The relative specificity of the language used
provides the striking difference between this act and the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act. While the federal statute does not control the secretary's discretion, it nevertheless clearly indicates the different courses that his regulation
may take. The Utah act, on the other hand, gives no hint of possible methods
of control; the board is left entirely to its own devices, the only statutory requirement being that the orders have as their aim, to "prevent the creation of
any surplus of market milk in the ••• area." u Since the delegation of legislative power is usually justified on grounds of practical necessity,1 G it may reasonably be demanded that the legislature should go as far as is practically possible
in directing the action of administrative agencies. Such a demand appears pertinent to the principal case. The Utah Milk Control Act might well have been
made more definite and instructive without its execution thereby being impaired;
numerous state acts would have served as satisfactory models.16 The policy
favoring certainty and efficiency of administration would seem to a:fford ample
justification for the decision of the court.
Edward S. Biggar

Ibid.,§ 6o8c (4).
Every order must contain one or more of several specified conditions. Ibid., §§
6o8c (7), 6o8c (5).
12 H. P. Hood & Sons v. United States, 307 U. S. 588 at 607, 59 S. Ct. 1019
(1939) (involving the Marketing Act): "These sections give the Secretary the choice
of three independent programs. • • • Within each, variation of the widest sort is
allowed."
18 For examples of broad delegations of power, see Federal Radio Commission v.
Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 53 S. Ct. 627 (1932), and Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185 (1912).
14 Utah Laws (1937), c. 7, § 4(b) (2).
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